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Abstract
Ethnicity, for those who subscribe to the concept, is understood to be one 'part1 of a
polity that contains, at least, other 'ethnicities' and probably many other kinds of
groupings and 'parts1. This paper argues that in order to understand ethnicity, we
must seek to understand why it is that people believe that 'society' is composed of
'parts' and to understand how those parts are visualized and 'imagined'. [To say that
they are imagined does not means that they are thought of as merely 'imaginary', but
rather that they depend on images and beliefs] In short, it is argued that 'ethnicities' are
conceptualised quite literally as maps, puzzles, blocks or masses, as groups or sets, as
levels or power 'bases'. Ethnicity can be also understood, at a higher level of
generalization as one moment, or part, of a complex visualization of other sorts of
social power such as 'state1, 'family' 'economic', spiritual/ancestral', 'witchcraft/sorcery'
and so on. Ethnicity, seen in this way then, appears not as some special 'social
formation', but rather as a special case of the visualization (or objectification,
reification) and metaphorization of social relations. It is these visualizations that make
political rhetoric and recruitment possible. They are objectified in 'ethnic' dress, dance,
the built environment, bodily dispositions, ritual forms, and other cultural displays
Ethnicity, then, is an aesthetic phenomenon, and must be understood at least partly in
these terms. This approach permits us to reason about why special kinds of social
power are associated with certain 'ethnicities' and thus to understand the cultural basis
for an imagined, socially transmitted and sanctioned geometry of social power.
As I sat down to write this paper, a young woman came into my office with an
invitation to a "Macedonian cultural evening", sponsored by the Greek Embassy, and
billing Macedonia as "the Bridgehead of Hellenism. My immediate reaction was to ask
the girl if she was a Macedonian. "No," she replied, "I'm just Greek, . . . well, actually
Cretan. I'm helping to distribute the invitations." I accepted my invitation, and
thought, "my god, not another ethnicity!!" The brief interchange had raised a number
of interesting points. A 'Macedonian' ethnicity had been distinguished from a "just
Greek" identity. Depending on how, when and who construed this statement, "just
Greek . . ." and ". . .well actually Cretan" might signify national, ethnic, sub-national,
supra-ethnic or even historical identities. The Macedonian "identity" was further
linked to a concrete image of a "bridgehead" and an abstract image—that is, and
imagination—of Hellenism.
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What had happened in these few words? Identities had been claimed, a polity had
been identified and partitioned into at least Macedonian and Cretan parts, with the
possibility of a "just Greek" residuum. I would also take both the concreteness of the
'bridgehead' metaphor and the abstractness of Hellenism to be significant. A tradition
had been named ('Hellenism), an emblem selected ('bridgehead'). In order to display
these cultural claims, I had been invited to celebrate at a party. Is this ethnicity? Or is
it just fun?
1. Ethnicity as the construction of social "parts1.
Ethnicity, at the simplest 'folk' level, is the recognition of social and cultural
differences in others, and the adoption of an identity by one's self. For 'ordinary
people', outside of the discourses of social science, ethnic difference is usually held to
be something other than racial or class (economic) difference. It is also held to be a
sort of sub-difference within the nation, and people generally believe that national
difference and national loyalties normally transcend—and, morally speaking, ought to
transcend— ethnic differences. Ethnicity, then, for most people is not racial, may often
subsume class difference, and is subsumed in turn by national difference. Among
social scientists, however, ethnicity is frequently said to 'cross-cut' these other kinds of
differences. Received wisdom asserts that ethnicity is 'caused' by power differences, or
by other more 'fundamental' differences such as race or class. For example a social
scientist who is committed to a "class analysis" will see ethnicity as the consequence of
class differences. The phenomenon itself is demoted to the status of sub-identities
within a class, or is considered to be subsumed by a "larger", often global (or 'world-
system') pattern of interactions that is ultimately caused by 'economy', 'material' or
'class'. By the same token, a social scientist who is committed to an analysis
conceived in terms of racial difference—such as the sociologist Hendrik Verwoerd, or
the anthropologist Eiselen, the major architects Apartheid —will see ethnicity as a
second-order commitment to local differences that are subsumed by the racial order or
things, or that are caused by 'race1. The racial order, in their case was, in turn, believed
to be subsumed and guaranteed by a God-given religious order, or a natural biological
order, and perhaps by both. While the one privileges a metaphysics of the material,
the other privileges a metaphysics of physical difference. Both rely on images of a
'more fundamental order1 which is held to determine ethnicity. Ethnicity is a
consequence of something else. I have only given two examples of this, one
'materialist', the other 'racist'. Both views have qualified as valid 'social science' for
some and at different periods of time. Some still believe them to be valid.
It is not my initial aim, however, to dispute the validity of these particular forms of
the causal account of ethnicity. I merely wish to point to the metaphysical
underpinnings2 of these 'social science' accounts and add that these views are rather far
from what 'ordinary people' know or feel to be the case.
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 I ask the reader to bear in mind that some metaphysics may indeed be more real or more useful
than others-but that is irrelevant here.
It is by now obvious that it is difficult to convince 'ordinary people1 that ethnicity is
anything other than what they know and believe it to be. Many instances from the
history of the twentieth century show this clearly. The Apartheid State in South
Africa, the Soviet Union with its tightly controlled empire, and numerous capitalist
democracies have used sophisticated techniques of persuasion ranging from near-total
control of the public media to direct and violent coercion either to persuade people
that their ethnic identities were not real or that they were other than they thought them
to be. For the most part, these exceptionally well-documented attempts to persuade
people that their ethnic identities were not genuine or were not somehow fundamental
to their well-being, identity and livelihood have failed. What has failed, specifically, is
the social scientist's conceptions of what ethnicity meant and what it might mean in the
future. It has failed, I think, because social science in all its many varieties, and in all
its attempts to support either a political Right or a political Left, has not sought to
understand the larger framework of social parts and social powers in which ethnicity
plays a part. Attempts to try to portray ethnicity as 'just class in another form1, or
simply a reflex of race, or as something other than what it is will continue to fail. In
fact, we may not be able to say what it is at all, any more than we can say definitively
what is race or what is class. We can examine its consequences, however, and we can
seek to deconstruct the idea of ethnicity itself. In doing this, we must seek to go
beyond the attempts to explain ethnicity as 'really' something else, and to eschew the
attractive belief that it is not really there.
I want to try to say something, then, about what 'ordinary' people might believe
about ethnicity. Beyond that, I hope to say something about an alternative approach to
understanding the nature of ethnicity. This is a purely conceptual analysis, a first
attempt, and not an empirical analysis of what real people say. It is, moreover, an
attempt by a social scientist who is committed to ideas that history is not predictable;
that real social processes are necessarily more complex than simple social theories can
entirely comprehend; and that people imagine their worlds, construct the terms under
which they live in those worlds and yet continue to believe that those worlds are
uniquely real; and that life is lived by means of, and in terms of systems of values,
symbols and signifiers. I believe that a thorough-going conceptual analysis is
necessary before new data can be collected that will do more than simply confirm old
beliefs.
What ordinary people seem to believe about ethnicity, then, is that it is an inevitable
part of the polities in which they live. It appears too, that ethnicity has some sense of
concreteness for most people; that is, it is a kind of social part3 that endures and has a
unique character. The concreteness of ethnicity, the special and compelling reality
that many people seem to feel is not exclusive of other kinds of identity. It has
presence, a sense of sui generis substance. It is is inclusive on most grounds—that is,.
most other forms of identity or difference are allowed within the category of ethnic
3
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identity—and is exclusive principally of other 'ethnicities'—that is it excludes identities
that are formulated on the same grounds.
For the most part, however, ethnicity in the theories of the social scientists is
'invention1, 'inauthentic', a 'construction', merely imagined. For ordinary people, these
words entirely miss the presence and substance that ethnicity seems to have to them.
To seek to deny it, or to seek to say that it is merely other, mere difference, simply
created, or whatever—that is to try to deny the very grounds on which it is given its
value in social action is to miss the boat as badly as Marx did with respect to religion.
We can not expect to understand the phenomenon while looking everywhere but at it.
1. Ethnicity as construction: a deconstruction
We now accept, most of us 'social scientists', that ethnicity is a 'construction1. While
this clears up the matter of thinking that ethnicity is somehow 'primordial1, or (socio-)
biological and not the result of historical processes and of culture, it still leaves us the
problem of what exactly we might mean by 'constructed1. If we are not clear about
what we mean by 'ethnicity,1 then to assert that ethnicity is constructed only
exacerbates the problem.
In order to advance the understanding of ethnicity we must 'deconstruct' the
category itself since it is considered to be a 'construction'. I am going to try to sketch
some ideas about how a 'deconstruction' of the notion of ethnicity might begin.
'Deconstruction', however, raises the fear of post-modernism in many minds today, and
the sort of analysis that it implies is not widely understood, nor accepted. Something
of a digression is necessary:--
'Deconstruction1 first of all is derived from the field of literary criticism. It is a
critical method that is perhaps most appropriately applied to actual texts of the literary
variety, but the extension of the method to a broader field of cultural criticism is
already well underway. The genie can not be stuffed back into the lit-crit bottle.
There is, of course, nothing simple about the concept of deconstruction, but simply
put, it is the attempt to grasp the nature of construction and to state with some
precision the metaphors and metonyms that make thought possible. This exercise is
essentially a philosophical one, since it assumes that there is nothing that humans think,
and nothing that they do that is not symbolically 'constructed1. The approach takes
seriously Nietzsche's dictum that all knowledge, all belief, all meaning is nothing other
than an infinite "chain of signifiers" and metaphors that signify each other and endlessly
mark differences and equalities, but never successfully nor fully refer to any world that
can be said to be outside of the world of the signifier. This is sometimes called the
'prison house of language'. Deconstruction is frequently taken to entail a commitment
to the idea that there is 'nothing outside the text1, that is, that all discourse is fully
conditioned by the existence of other different and previous discourses from which no
subsequent discourse ever escapes. The common locution that something is "always
already" there—that is, that it is neither possible nor useful to believe that some
condition, category, possibility or limit is not already and always conditioning the
content of whatever is the subject or topic of analysis—signifies that there is no 'origin'
of a discursive practice before which some particular condition does not apply, or that
there is no 'point' outside of the textual tradition from which some exterior judgment
can be made. (It is locutions like this one, and sentences like the previous one, that
give deconstruction and post-modernism a bad name.) In other words, if we accept
this view of the nature of cultural products (and, by extension, of the nature of all
things and notions which are 'constructed') then there is no exterior position from
which to judge any action, any event, any statement or pretense as morally good,
empirically valid, or transcendentally true.4 Deconstruction then, as a critical method ,
accepts this stance with regard to judgment (judgments of moral goodness, aesthetic
beauty, propositional truth-value, empirical or referential validity, transcendent or
ultimate truth, and so on ) and attempts to show how and with what assumptions the
claims to truth, beauty, validity, goodness, etc. are made, and on what grounds these
claims are accepted by a reader, an observer, or a consumer.
As long as we are dealing with literary texts—that is with fictions— this stance is
probably justified since the readers of literary fictions already assume a skeptical stance
with respect to factuality. The literary fiction is not merely 'constructed', but is
constructed in the expectation that certain special standards of judgment will be
applied (or suspended) for the sake of the pleasures that reading fiction gives us. If the
'constructed-ness' of ethnicity were taken to be of this sort, the project would seem
ludicrous. Since some writers sometimes take ethnicity to be a construction of this
sort, as John Comaroff appears to do in "Of Totemism and Ethnicity" (Comaroff and
Comaroff 1992), it is worth while to point out that such writers are confused.
Deconstruction of this variety is inappropriate to the project of a more broadly
conceived cultural criticism.
Deconstruction of categories like ethnicity seem constantly to be in danger of
destroying the very data they must stand on. Real people commit real resources,
including their own bodies and those of their kin, to the 'fictions' of ethnicity. In
applying these techniques to cultural categories, then, it is not possible to maintain the
same assumptions as those on which the practice of a purely literary deconstruction is
practiced. To do so makes the project of post-modernism and deconstruction seem
absurd to those of our practical-minded and feet-on-the-ground colleagues. The
mistake arises because 'ordinary people', those who believe they belong to ethnic
groups, do not agree before hand to the suspension of judgment in the construction of
social and cultural forms in which they participate. People do not—emphatically do
not—agree before hand, implicitly or explicitly that 'ethnicity', 'nation', kinship,
community of faith, and other similar 'constructions' are to be taken as 'imaginary'.
They do not accept that moral judgment will be suspended while they are acting
'ethnically', or expressing a national patriotism, or behaving 'like a man', or acting 'like
a lady'. These are positions and construction that are taken serioitsly. To take
something seriously, however, is a stance that requires commitment of resources,
intellect and belief. The seriousness of ethnicity and its like is a sort of generically
different order of belief than the 'imaginary' of literary fiction. The important point is
that both those things that people take seriously—that is those things to which they
willing to fully commit themselves, their intellect and their resources—may be as fully
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constructed as those things which they take to be 'imaginary'. The imaginary of fiction
is constituted by those imagined worlds or entities to which we commit only our sense
of belief and appreciation of possibility, but not out intellect, our bodies or our
resources. Ethnicity is a fiction, but it is a serious fiction and therefore real.
If we can make this distinction, then it is possible to apply the concept of
deconstruction to those fictions that we take seriously, that is, we can take apart and
review the fundamental categories and commitments that underpin the serious
constructs within which lives are really led. It is important to make this distinction
since a methodological deconstructionism does not imply a moral vacuum nor political
paralysis.5 It does require, however, a willingness to re-imagine a field of intellectual
inquiry with which we social scientists mostly think we are already quite familiar: the
field of power, power relations, and ethnicity.
It is commonplace in today's discussions of sociology to assert that ethnicity,
nationalisms, tribalisms, and other kinds of sectional loyalties and identities are
'constructions'. This assertion means a number of things to a number of different
people, but what is common is that these ideas are not 'natural*, that they are built up
through an historical process, and that they are part of political systems in which they
function as emblems of identity and as banners under which membership to these social
categories is recruited. Implicit in this now-widespread conception of the
constructedness of these categories, is the possibility that they can be either
reconstructed in different ways, and that they can be destroyed, if necessary, through
appropriate means. Although the theoretical vocabulary of'construction' and '
imagination1 is relatively recent, the project of reconstruction or destruction of
ethnicities or nationalities has been a central part of the many projects of social
engineering that have characterized much of the last half of the nineteenth century and
most of this century. Indeed, it is probably the practices of the modern socialist,
national socialist and other authoritarian and centralist states that has given weight and
urgency to the notions of'imagination' and 'constructedness1 of these categories.
Projects of national cleansing, ethnocide, genocide, national socialisms (of the
Apartheid or the NAZI varieties), have aimed either to create or to destroy various
versions of ethnicity or nationalisms by means of persuasion (propaganda, control of
the new and popular media), bureaucratic manipulation (passes, visas and passports,
residential registration, etc.), forms of economic pressure (special taxation, fines,
restrictions on access to capital, money land or other resources), and in the most
extreme cases torture, rape, terrorism, and genocide.
Ethnicity, as such, is not the problem
It is for these reasons that ethnicity is now at issue. But it seems to me that
ethnicity per se is not the problem. We might say, as a first approximation that it is
the effect of ethnicity as social instrument that is the problem. But what do we
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achieve by speaking as if'ethnicity' is the cause of other social events or structures, or
that it is itself caused by other different events and structures? The problem, in other
words, is not so much ethnicity itself as the notions of cause and effect that are implicit
in the social science versions of causal accounts. Unfortunately, the social science
causal account shares a great deal with the many different programs of ethnic
'cleansing1, racial 'hygiene' and social engineering that have taken us so close to the
precipice of annihilation so often in our era.
The notion that 'ethnicity' is the causal result of colonial 'impact' or capitalist
'penetration' are only conventionally causal. Cause, in the strict sense, could be taken
only to describe the relation of physical masses and forces and the observable events
that are immediately consequential (that is have a strict sequential relation in time and
space) on other events. The notion of cause in the social sciences is already a
metaphor. The sense of these statements—colonial impact, capitalist penetration-
depends crucially on the image of two masses or entities that are capable (in our
imaginations) of impact or penetration. Of course, in reality, there are no such
'masses' that are capable of physical relations of this kind, and thus there can be no real
causal account that relies on the metaphors of cause and substance that 'impact' and
'penetration' (or any other metaphors of force, striking, or entry) imply. What we are
trying to convey in these metaphors, I think, is better described as relations of social
power.
In their application to Africa, the metaphorical figures of masses, impacts and
penetrations that we have referred to, rely for their rhetorical force on the idea that
African societies were i) static wholes that could be metaphorised with the image of
the 'mass'; and ii) were unable to 'invent' ethnicity for themselves. The notion that
African societies were static wholes has been quite comprehensively demolished within
the discipline of Anthropology, but is still held to be a valid proposition—or tenet of
belief— for many contemporary sociologists and historians. The second implied
notion, that African societies were only on the receiving end of the causal arrow of
world history, is scarcely acknowledged yet in any discipline, but I think that many
people already realize the implication of such a position and are uncomfortable with it.
The problem with these metaphors, is that they are incapable of allowing us to
conceptualise the individual event within the 'mass', or the complexity of processes that
do not all have any causal links between them. In other words, the global sociologies
based on Marxism and structuralism do not permit us to understand the human scale
on which events proceed. They do not allow us to perceive the differences of scale
between the kinds of social parts that have come into interaction with one another.
Finally, they do not permit us to understand, or to talk usefully about, the sorts of
causes that are relevant to social events. The only causal account that is relevant, I
believe, is an account of what we call *power'. Power (the word itself) is already only
an umbrella term under which many forms of social interaction are summed up and
labeled. To understand it, a thoroughgoing critical understanding of what the
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern has called 'the Western Metaphysic' is essential.6 In
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history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix . . . is the determination of being as presence
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undertaking such a project, however, precious concepts such as "society" (in the
Durkheimian sense), and "politics" (in the Weberian sense) must be jettisoned in favour
of careful examination of the nature of power in all social relations, of concepts of the
person, of gender, of violence and so on.
Our problem, then, becomes one of deconstruction of metaphors. We are still left
with the metaphors of the 'common man1 who uses these to talk about and to
understand his common predicament. But some of the outmoded metaphors of the
social sciences can now be discarded, especially those that we believed, until now,
permitted us to stand outside this common predicament and look at it 'from a distance1.
We may be able to gain some distance, but that does not absolve us from examining
our metaphors and the constructions of causality that we impose on the social world
which we attempt to understand.
Ethnicity is not just The State*
It is certainly clear that ethnicity is closely associated with what we variously call
the nation, the state, and the 'nation state' or occasionally, the country. The state, in
simplest definitional terms is the governmental apparatus of a country, or alternatively
of a 'nation1. We might add to this the symbolic manifestation of government and
countries such as capital cities, national shrines and secular religion, including
monuments, anthems, state symbols, formulaic rhetorics at occasions of State, quasi-
prayers, and so on. For the most part, social science deals with 'the state1. This misses
the point for the 'ordinary person', though it might prove something about habits of
discourse. The idea of'The state1 is fossilized today in the tough ancient amber of
theory. Ethnicities live in countries and often ignore the state; they transcend it in
trans-national cultural movements, and
The notion of the 'country', however, is less theorised though much more widely
used by the 'ordinary person'. The country may be the territorial extent of power
exercised by the government, although today there are many parts of the world that
would qualify as 'countries' even though they lack any, or any single 'state1. The
'country' is the content of an imagined border-imagined through the medium of the
map or of the image of a 'country-side', and ethnicities are parts of these kinds of
wholes.
The notion of the State, however, has remained fundamentally unchanged since the
foundation of the Roman Republic and the codification of its laws under the Emperors.
This was the first watershed, since the Romans were perhaps the first to speak of
ethnes in roughly the same way we use it today. They meant the non-Roman peoples
who had gradually become incorporated into the Empire. The Greeks before them had
also used the term, and contrasted it to the demos, those people of non-Greek origin
energeia, ousia (essence,, existence, substance, and subject) aletheia, transcendcntality,, or
conscience, God, man and so forth." (Writing and Difference, quote in Spivak, Translator's Preface
to Of Grammatotogy, p. xxi.)
who lived outside of the Ancient polities of the Greek city states. This model was re-
discovered, and re-invented during the Enlightenment, and then applied rather
uncritically to the social theory during the nineteenth century by people like Henry
Maine, Karl Marx, Lewis Henry Morgan, and Herbert Spencer, among many others.
Thus it is that the theory that ethnicity is only definable in terms of the state, and in
opposition to it, has had a long history. In as much as the theory of the state is the
same since Roman times (Maine, Morgan and Marx, in fact, added little to it) our
theories of ethnicity remain largely constrained by the particular imagination implicit in
the Roman Tables of the Law. It is incumbent upon us to at least re-examine some
aspects of this in order to understand the relations that might really exist between the
European State (which is really the Roman notion of sovereignty over territory) and
the pre-European forms of polity that existed in Africa and which still show some
continuities into the present.
The first social interactions between Africans and Europeans in Africa almost
always resulted in attempts by Africans to incorporate what they understood to be new
sources of power, new sources of goods, and new sources of value into their own
relatively smaller scale polities. There was first of all a difference in scale between the
two polities that were represented by Africans and Europeans, but of equal importance
was the differences in the kind of value each sought to maximize. The African
societies sought to maximize social values of prestige, personal authority, charisma,
and varieties of power that were incorporated in the individual body. These were held
to originate somewhere or somewhen else, in other 'sources' of power. Example of
these sources of power were ancestors, herbs, named spiritual entities of various sorts,
and each others bodies. They sought to incorporate the European versions of these
powers, as they saw then, into their own polities and in terms of their own histories
and historical imaginations. For the Africans in these earliest encounters—but also
continuing through the entire history of what is now a complex of internal
relationships—values either circulated within restricted domains of exchange, or they
served as metaphors for each other. Thus, while personal essences or hereditary
powers ordinarily circulated within restricted channels of kinship, they could also be
metaphorically extended in witchcraft and sorcery practices. On the other hand, for
the Europeans , value was imagined to inhere in goods. The kinds of value that could
be signified and carried by goods, moreover, was strictly distinguished from the kinds
of values that could be signified by persons, and that could be carried by persons.
Examples of the first kind of value were things, things of all kinds, but especially things
that did not change (gold and ivory) or that could sustain physical loads (iron, tin,
copper, wood, leather) or that could be used to assemble other things (gums and
fibres). Examples of the second kind of value were 'souls' and spirits, but also the
human physical capacities to make goods, and sexual capacities to reproduce (make
people). Europeans sought labour 'power', the capacities to reproduce by means of
muscular energy and intellectual conceptualization the goods of culture. What labour
makes is the things that can carry other kinds of cultural values. Thus, the
interaction that we characterize as colonial impact or capitalist penetration was instead
a disjuncture of the scale of polities and of the nature of the values that people sought
to maximize through their activities within them.
Thus, African societies sought first to incorporate value as they saw it. Only when
they were on the verge of being overwhelmed by the polities into which they had
recently come into contact did they seek to identify and to defend their boundaries.
These defenses were often mounted too late to be effective. This was partly due to the
limits on the size of the African polities themselves. The common African political
features of low-level and small-scale democracy among men, where value inheres
mainly in animals (especially) cattle and a few restricted mediums of exchange (but no
money), and the kinship metaphors of political identity dictated, in effect, that African
polities remained small with no (or very few ) independently active individuals and
very few large states capable of military action. In the early instances, these small
scale polities competed among themselves to capture to incorporate what they saw as
external sources of goods and power that they did not themselves produce. So long as
these inputs were small—as during the slave trade and the early mercantile trade by
Portuguese, Dutch Arab and Indians— these polities were not overwhelmed, but rather
maintained tenuous balances of power. Eventually, they were overwhelmed and re-
emerged as 'countries'. After de-colonization, the apparatus of'European' (i.e.
Roman-like) states continued or were set up. Today, in much of Africa there is little
left of this peculiar social form. Countries and ethnicities, however, remain
By drawing this distinction in such broad terms, we are able to begin to set up a
categorical distinction between polities that seek to incorporate power from outside of
their boundaries and those that seek to exert their power beyond their boundaries.
Classically, it was African societies that sought to incorporate powers into the
structures of polity that already existed, while it was Europe that sought to extend
(often to the most absurd degree possible) their own internal structures of authority
and organization in order to control what was beyond their boundaries. These
opposite strategies, founded on quite different concepts of boundary, difference, value
and cause, are responsible in large part for what we call ethnicity in Africa today. I
think that an understanding of these phenomena in their own terms will take us much
farther along the road to understanding that the nineteenth century Industrial Age
metaphors of impact (or the crypto-sexual metaphor of penetration), or the borrowed
theory of the "state" (well polished though it may be).
First of all, an incorporative strategy implies an outlook of a 'zero sum game' in
which the gains of one player are the loses of the other 'player1. To transcend the
image is very difficult indeed. One way is to seek an external guarantor that will
attempt to make up the difference between what one side gains and what the other side
loses. This strategy often works when there is enough surplus in the system such as
the New Deal of FDR, or when there is some other source of external value such as
the European's own successful redistribution (among themselves) of the accumulated
gold of the Incas or and Aztecs in the fifteenth century. While such redistributions
serve to jolt a limited political entity out of its previous state of economic solipsism,
jealousy and resentment, it cannot be sustained. The other alternative is for some
larger alternative vision of the limits of the polity to emerge. Such a transformation of
the imagination occurred when Europeans gradually created the global economy of the
empires and colonies. As Europeans gradually exhausted what could be simply
plundered, and sought instead not just to capture the products of external economies
but to control them indirectly, they had to transform their imagination of the nature of
the world itself. This resulted in the transformation of the rapaciousness of Columbus
or Van Riebeeck into the sophisticated systems of control that now reside in the
District of Columbia and in Pretoria! These imaginations of global economies are the
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conditions for escape7 from the image of the limited good to the image of unlimited
goods.
The recognition of ethnic parts depends on the visualizable
image of a polity
In effect, the 'imagination' of ethnicity can be taken to be a 'serious fiction1 in the
form of an image of the polity that is divided into parts. It is essential to take the idea
of image quite seriously—that is, to recognize that the sense of reality and presence
that ethnicity has is founded on the concreteness that a visualizable picture or 'political
map1 of the polity gives. Under this view, the physical emblems of the 'ethnic group',
the badges of its identity (such as monuments, clothes, anthems, or 'ways of life'8 are
not merely symbols that refer to some other reality—imagined, primordial, constructed,
economic, material, or whatever-but are rather part and parcel of the presence and
feeling of substance that ethnicity has for its members. The symbols of ethnic identity
are not 'totems', and they are not names; they do not refer to other meanings, nor do
they serve as labels for things or concepts or sets which are selected by other means.
Instead, they 'stand for themselves1, non-referentially as parts of what being ethnic
is. If they do not 'refer1—that is if the emblems of ethnicity do not act as 'words' in a
'language ' of identity in the conventional linguistic or semiotic or symbolic sense,
then we may not speak of them as symbols of identity. The emblems of ethnic identity
do not name or refer to the 'group' anymore than the Mona Lisa's smile 'refers to 'or
'labels' her face. It is simply part of the picture.
There is an immediate corollary of this: ethnicity is essentially an aesthetic
phenomenon, and is perceived and evaluated aesthetically by those who profess any
ethnic identity.
This view of ethnicity as a fundamentally aesthetic phenomenon helps us to account
for its troublesome ahistorical character. Participants in ethnic identities do not
typically understand themselves to have acquired that identity, nor do they understand
the identity as just a 'phase' or 'stage' of growth, historical change, or development.
This is what makes the study of ethnicity so mightily resistant to the conventional
semiotic and functional analyses we have so far brought to bear on it. While
intellectuals have struggled to give complex historical accounts of the origin of
ethnicity, the 'common man', the believer, the person who explains his behaviour and
that of others in terms of ethnicity, is resolutely ahistorical: the identities have 'always'
been as they are, and will remain so. This view is maintained despite much evidence to
the contrary in many cases. Any account which claims that the subjects are simply
misinformed about the matters of their own belief, of course, simply negates the
empirical facts of belief, or seeks to privilege some alternate account. Either way, the
belief itself is not taken into account. Ethnic identities are held to be timeless by most
7
 The notion of'conditions of escape'from certain forms of economy is Ernest Gellner's (1988).
8
 Including all aspects of what Bourdieu has called the 'habitus1.
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of those who profess or declare such identities. Ethnicity is categorical for them, and
not something that they perceive themselves as having grown into—like manhood, or
professionalism-or having acquired through a process-like wealth, motherhood, and
wisdom. The very categorical feel of a person's declarations of an ethnic identity
marks it, empirically, as a fundamentally aesthetic response.
The second characteristic of ethnicity that marks it as an aesthetic phenomenon,
rather than an historical, political or economic one, is its situational character. Ethnic
identities are 'declared' only under certain circumstances. When they are declared, the
aesthetic display is crucially important: ethnic costume, special modes and registers of
speech, music and art festivals, ethnic dance, and, in South Africa at least, 'cultural
weapons'(although the ritual display of uniforms, insignia, fancy hats and dance-like
bodily dispositions of any, even the most powerful military, all qualify as cultural
weapons as well). All of these performances mark ethnicity, but they are also
aesthetic expressions and are evaluated as more or less 'pure1 forms of art, music,
dance, or physical display.
What do I mean, then, by this use of the term 'aesthetic1? First, an aesthetic is a
judgment based on some standard of beauty, truth, goodness, The Good', or some
other system of transcendent value and static truth. The aesthetic judgment is a
judgment of the state of being of an object, not its state of becoming. As such it is
immune to judgments of practical reason, that is, judgments of efficiency, means-to-
ends rationality, usefulness, economy or science. An aesthetic judgment is a judgment
based on transcendent categories that are held to be timeless, or at least beyond time.
The aesthetic is not evaluated according to criteria in which time would be relevant.
The aesthetic object is not good because it is efficient or quick, but because it is good.
Secondly, the aesthetic judgment assesses the object as a whole. The good is good
because it is whole, complete, entire. The broken, the injured, the partitioned object,
the partial, and the incomplete are not 'good ' or beautiful because they are not whole.
An unfinished painting is not a masterpiece. The novel that leaves characters and
motives 'hanging', unfulfilled, without closure, is not satisfying. Health is good
because it is conceived holistically as the proper state of wholeness of the body. The
stranger within the gates is dangerous not because he poses an economic or political
threat but because he offends the image of wholeness that wall and gates are meant—
and usually do produce. All of these sorts of judgments are 'aesthetic'
Ethnic identity, then, precisely because it is felt to be timeless and consists of a
categorical judgment, can be said to be an aesthetic identity. Ethnicity is held to be a
solidary part of a larger polity, and therefore a whole unto itself while also being part
of another whole (this is possible under conditions of aesthetic judgment, although it is
logically impossible). The assessment of ethnicity, and the claim to ethnic identity,
then, is an aesthetic judgment. Ethnicity is one kind of'part' in a visualised polity that
consists of other 'parts' and powers. If it is true that a polity exists (at least partly) as
an imagination of holism, then we can sum up by saying: ethnicity is an aesthetic
holism without the State.
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